Rasmusen writes: “In general, compare the legal craftsmanship of the Court of Appeals opinion with the Supreme Court one, especially in the care and respect with which it explains why it thinks the other side’s arguments are wrong.” The Court of Appeals opinion addressed the central issue in the case as follows:

Barnes argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to give the following jury instruction:
“When an arrest is attempted by means of a forceful and unlawful entry into a citizen’s home, such entry represents the use of excessive force, and the arrest cannot be considered peaceable. Therefore, a citizen has the right to reasonably resist the unlawful entry.” Appellant’s App. p. 18.

Barnes’s tendered instruction was not covered by the other instructions given. Further, Barnes’s instruction is a correct statement of the law. “Indiana law recognizes the right to reasonably resist the unlawful entry of a police officer into a person’s home.” Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied).

. . .

Citing Robinson, the State argues that the instruction should not have been given because a defendant may not resist unlawful entry by battering a police officer. In Robinson, police officers responding to a 911 call of a possible domestic disturbance, refused to leave the premises after Robinson told them to leave. When an officer attempted to come onto the porch of the residence, Robinson pushed the officer off of the porch. Robinson appealed his conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer, and we concluded that Robinson’s act of pushing the officer off of his porch was not reasonable resistance. 704 N.E.2d at 708. Specifically, we stated “[t]he right to reasonably resist an unlawful entry does not include the right to commit a battery upon a police officer.” Id.

However, our court also stated: “there can be a fine line between reasonable resistance and battery, but that is for the jury to resolve.” Id. at 709 (emphasis added). Therefore, whether Barnes’s act of shoving Officer Reed out of the doorway of his apartment was battery or “reasonable resistance” is a fact question for the jury to resolve.

Seattle crime-fighting “superhero” Phoenix Jones knows he has it, and more power to him.

The Indiana Supreme Court, on the other hand, despite all the public outrage over its decision in Barnes v. State, continues to insist that in Indiana the Castle Doctrine is no longer a defense to the crime of battery (defined by the Indiana Code as “touch[ing] . . . in a rude, insolent, or angry manner”) when it’s a police officer rather than a mere mundane (whom Hoosiers are as free to batter as before) whose unlawful residential entry a homeowner tries to prevent or terminate by such “touching.” (Interestingly, the Court’s opinion on rehearing doesn’t mention the statutory definition of battery, and appears to implicitly broaden it, by denying the right of homeowners even to “get physical” with police officers. But I can easily imagine “getting physical” in ways that don’t necessarily involve touching in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner.” Can a bouncer who bodily and forcefully but otherwise calmly and non-violently removes a belligerent drunk from a bar automatically be said to touch him “rudely” or “insolently” or “angrily”? This would seem like exactly the kind of question a jury should decide. But the very point of Barnes v. State was to preclude the jury from deciding this kind of question.)

What recently changed my mind about these cases is the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tyrus Coleman v. State (2011), and the utter failure of these cases to do Mr. Coleman (whom I represented at trial) any good. Now when I read Yeager the only significant thing about the case seems to me to be the fact that the defendant, Mr. Yeager, was an Enron executive.

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Mr. Coleman’s case came less than a week after that court rendered its infamous decision in Barnes, which purports to abrogate the right of the people to reasonably resist unlawful police entry into their homes. I lament the fact that Barnes has gotten all the attention and public vilification, while the court’s disposal of Coleman has gotten none, even though both cases equally exude the pernicious implication that only police officers are entitled to use force to defend themselves or others and that the only allowable recourse of a man facing armed and dangerous men who are in the act of invading his property is to call the police.

In the wake of the political fallout over Barnes the Indiana Attorney General has put on his white hat and joined the chorus condemning Barnes:

I support a rehearing of the case to allow for a more narrow ruling that would continue to recognize the individual right of reasonable resistance to unlawful entry. In our brief and argument to the Indiana Supreme Court last fall, my office did not advocate for the type of ruling the Court issued last week.

Here’s my response to that, borrowing from Eric Turkewitz: “Go shit in your white hat and pull it down over your ears.” Your office didn’t have to petition the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer after the Indiana Court of Appeals rendered its eminently reasonable decision that would have freed Tyrus Coleman — an innocent man — on the grounds of collateral estoppel, but it did.

And speaking of going above and beyond the call of duty, here are the principal considerations which normally govern the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant transfer:

(1)     Conflict in Court of Appeals’ Decisions. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals on the same important issue.

(2)    Conflict with Supreme Court Decision. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court on an important issue.

(3)    Conflict with Federal Appellate Decision. The Court of Appeals has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals.

(4)    Undecided Question of Law. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of law or a case of great public importance that has not been, but should be, decided by the Supreme Court.

(5)    Precedent in Need of Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals has correctly followed ruling precedent of the Supreme Court but such precedent is erroneous or in need of clarification or modification in some specific respect.

(6)    Significant Departure From Law or Practice. The Court of Appeals has so significantly departed from accepted law or practice or has sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or Administrative Agency as to warrant the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction.

You will search the Indiana Supreme Court’s published opinion in Coleman in vain for any new explication of the law of collateral estoppel, any explanation of how the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision had “departed from accepted law or practice” (let alone “significantly”), or any hint of the above-listed “considerations” which normally govern whether the Indiana Supreme Court grants transfer. Even though the first jury in Coleman’s case had acquitted him of murder and hung on the attempted murder charge (which in a just world and a just legal system would establish reasonable doubt as to Mr. Coleman’s guilt on both charges), and even though there was nothing contrary to established law in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the “Justices” on the Indiana Supreme Court chose to condemn Mr. Coleman to 45 years in prison for doing something that I believe with every fiber of my being was completely justified.

First and foremost I know none of the individuals nor any of their family members involved in this. Having only followed coverage of this trial by this media. This is one of those traits of our court system that continues to perplex me. The Indiana Court of Appeals after careful consideration appeared to side with argument presented on behalf of Tyrus Coleman. The Indiana Supreme Court upon review of essentially the same evidence in turn rendered decision in total opposition to the lower court findings. Keep in mind, aside from the local trials these findings were not rendered by empaneled novice jurors. We as society are to then believe justice has truly been served in spite of the contradictions presented by our own court system.

“…Coleman had a criminal record and was on probation at the time, so, Rucker wrote, “We have not been persuaded that Coleman’s character or the nature of his offense requires a revision of Coleman’s sentence.”

Would it be unfair of me to mimic Justice Rucker’s apparent sense of logic as presented in the above quote and state that I have not found this session of the Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions logical when factored in with prior decision such as the ruling last week that one should not resist, but rather surrender self-protection and seek remedy later through the court if presented with illegal home invasion by authority; even if that authority is a K-9 officer gnawing on your flesh.

I borrow words that several years ago got an Indiana attorney suspended from the practice of law by the Indiana Supreme Court, and affirm that I am “left to wonder” by the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion whether the Indiana Supreme Court was determined to keep Tyrus Coleman in prison for the next few decades of his life — separated from the young son whose life along with his own he honorably and courageously defended on his own property on the tragic day in question — “and then said whatever was necessary to reach that conclusion (regardless of whether the facts or the law supported that conclusion).” I don’t express this opinion “with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Rather, I base this opinion on a careful comparison of the “intellectual integrity” of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that would have set Tyrus free with the intellectual integrity of the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion that condemns him to decades in prison, and on the observation that the Supreme Court’s opinion hardly addressed the argument that the Court of Appeals found convincing — if it can be said to have addressed it at all. I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and self-refuting assertion that “although Coleman had the opportunity to do so, he never used his cell phone to contact the police and inform them that two armed and dangerous men were on his property.” (Coleman had no opportunity to contact the police during the three or so seconds it took the second of these two armed and dangerous men, Anthony Dye, to march up to within “close range” of Coleman after first appearing in Coleman’s back yard.) I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and baseless assertion that Coleman and Dye were “friends.” I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s omission of the critical and undisputed fact that Coleman knew that Dye had previously served time in prison for shooting at a police officer. (Dye himself is currently serving a prison sentence for being a “serious violent felon” in possession of a handgun when he strode onto Coleman’s property.) I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s treating as an aggravator the fact that, when Coleman fired his weapon while standing directly in front of the only door to his garage, Coleman’s young son was inside that garage. I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and misleading assertion that “After Dye was immobilized and fell to the ground, Coleman fired again striking Dye in the chest.” This clearly implies, falsely, that Coleman shot Dye after he was already on the ground and no longer a threat. (Earlier in the opinion, the court asserts: “As Dye stepped in front of Coleman, Coleman raised his gun and fired at Dye, who immediately fell to the ground. Coleman then shot Dye a second time.”) In fact, the evidence at trial and in the record clearly demonstrated the falsity of this implication. Dye “fell” forward to the ground and landed on his stomach. The round that struck him in the chest clearly was fired before Dye fell to the ground. Furthermore, the surveillance video which captured the entire incident clearly showed that, at the time this second shot must have been fired, Dye, as he was “falling” forward towards the ground, was not “immobilized” but was raising his gun and pointing it at Coleman.

I borrow the words of another man who was falsely and unjustly condemned by men less honorable than he:

Do not judge or go to law, do not punish, and you yourself will not be judged or punished. Forgive everyone and you will be forgiven; but if you judge others they will judge you also.

You cannot judge, for men are all blind and do not see the truth. How can you see a speck in your brother’s eye when there is dust in your own? You must first get your own eye clear-but whose eyes are perfectly clear? Can a blind man lead the blind? They will both fall into the pit.

And those who judge and punish are like blind men leading the blind.

Those who judge, and condemn others to violent treatment, wounds, mutilation, or death, wish to correct them, but what can come of their teaching except that the pupils will learn to become just like their teacher? What then will they do when they have learnt the lesson? Only what their teacher does: violence and murder.

And do not expect to find justice in the courts. To entrust one’s love of justice to men’s courts is like throwing precious pearls to swine: they will trample on them and will tear you to pieces.

[T]here is a rule older and superior to that of the Constitution.  Many Americans do not believe that to be the case.  There is a philosophical divide in America, with the Justices of the Indiana court, and their Constitution, on one side, and a different law on the other.

One American called it “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God”.

One Englishman called it “the Law of the Jungle”. [Link added.]

In the recently published decision that Patrick is referring to, Barnes v. State, a majority of the Indiana Supreme Court holds that “the right to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law.”

The dissenters describe the majority as having “abrogated” this right. But rights can’t be “abrogated.” They can only be ignored and violated.

There is no right more fundamental than the right to defend one’s self, family, and home. Verily, from this right derives whatever justification, if any, “the law” itself might have. Yet the Indiana Supreme Court in Barnes cites with apparent approval “legal scholarship” which “[i]n the 1920s . . . began criticizing” the right to resist unlawful police action “as valuing individual liberty over physical security of the officers.” But as a commenter at the Volokh Conspiracy trenchantly observes: “There is a reason why officer safety is not included in the Bill of Rights, and that is because they are part of the danger being protected against.”

In actuality, though, “the law” and the State derived from the Constitution doesn’t exist “to protect and serve.” Rather, it exists to extort and exploit, and whatever protecting it might do is secondary and incidental to that overarching purpose. To see that this is so, compare what the State has done to this man who honorably and courageously defended himself and his son and friends from two armed and dangerous men on his own property, with what the State didn’t do to this cowardly police officer who gunned down a man on a city street without justification.

If “the law” fails to recognize the right of a man to defend himself and his family and friends on his own property, then it is good for nothing except to be thrown out and trampled underfoot.