Dye was the “victim” in a case I’ve talked about a lot here on this blog, Tyrus Coleman v. State of Indiana. Dye’s conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon was based on the same tragic incident in 2007 on which Tyrus Coleman’s conviction for the Attempted Murder of Dye was based.

In rejecting Dye’s argument that his sentence is inappropriately harsh, the majority wrote:

The nature of Dye’s crime was not that of mere benign possession of a handgun. According to Dye, he was called by his son for assistance in a confrontation with two armed men who had previously robbed Dye at gunpoint. The result of the ensuing battle was the death of Dye’s son and Dye himself being shot twice. Had Dye simply contacted the authorities instead of seeking to address the situation himself, perhaps his son would still be alive. Moreover, the record indicates that Dye’s motives in coming to his son’s aid were not entirely noble, as the record indicates that he intended to rob at least one of the two armed men in retaliation for the earlier robbery. In light of this, it is worth noting that the facts of the incident would have, at the very least, supported a charge of attempted Class A felony robbery, for which Dye could have received a base sentence of up to fifty years of incarceration.

[Although I didn’t see the testimony at Dye’s trial, based on the testimony at Coleman’s trial this account of the incident appears slightly confused. Two men were involved in the earlier robbery, but Coleman wasn’t one of them, and only one of those two men were on Coleman’s property on the date of the incident. Furthermore, at the time of the incident on Coleman’s property only Dye, Dye’s son, and Coleman were armed.]

The Honorable Melissa May, who was born in Elkhart, Indiana (where this incident took place), dissented from the majority’s affirmation of Dye’s adjudication as an Habitual Offender, on the grounds that it was an improper double enhancement, since

Dye’s conviction of possession of a handgun by a serious violent felon (“SVF”) was premised on a 1998 conviction of attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon. His habitual offender adjudication rests on another 1998 conviction, of possession of a handgun within a thousand feet of a school, which arose out of the same incident as did the attempted battery conviction on which the SVF count was based.

Judge May believes

the majority’s result “contradict[s] the Rule of Lenity . . . and place[s] form over substance,” [citation omitted] to the extent it holds two offenses that are so related they could not be used together for an habitual offender enhancement are, at the same time, so unrelated that they may support a double enhancement in the form of an SVF count and an habitual offender enhancement.

For its part, the majority wrote:

Unless and until the Indiana Supreme Court holds that two distinct convictions arising out of the same res gestae [i.e., “things done,” meaning acts, words, and declarations that are so closely connected to the main fact or transaction as to be a part of it] cannot be used as they were here, we shall adhere to the general principle that double enhancement challenges only arise when the same conviction is used twice.

Judge May in a footnote quotes the Indiana Supreme Court to describe the Rule of Lenity: “It is a familiar principle that statutes which are criminal or penal in their nature or which are in derogation of a common-law right must be strictly construed,” and “where there is ambiguity it must be resolved against the penalty . . . .”

A logical and natural corollary of the Rule of Lenity is that constitutional and common-law rights should be liberally construed. Coincidentally, Judge May was in the majority in the Court of Appeals decision that would have freed, on Double Jeopardy grounds, Tyrus Coleman, whose use of deadly force on the tragic day in question was justified by his unalienable and statutory right to defend himself and others from what he reasonably believed to be Dye’s imminent commission of a forcible felony. Tragically, the Indiana Supreme Court didn’t see things her way.

And some cops aren’t, like this local cop who shot and killed an unarmed man who’d led police on a pursuit before crashing into a building:

The chase ended after ten minutes when Bledsoe crashed his truck into the main building at Faubian Plumbing, Heating & A/C Inc. The business located in the 700-block of E. Lincoln Ave. saw nearly $10,000 in damage.

Police say Bledsoe tried to dislodge his truck from the building by flooring the accelerator as police surrounded him. After refusing to stop, Bledsoe was shot once in the neck.

(Compare the case of Tyrus Coleman.)

Just being a cop, or a fire fighter, (or a lawyer, or a judge) doesn’t mean squat:

A federal judge’s order to have a court-appointed monitor oversee the employment practices of the New York Fire Department, “a stubborn bastion of white male privilege,” is entirely justified.

Judge Nicholas Garaufis of Federal District Court ruled on Wednesday that the department’s hiring practices and racially biased tests systematically excluded blacks from its ranks. As a result, the department is about 3 percent black in a city where roughly a quarter of the population is black.

Under the ruling, a monitor will have to be installed to ensure that the department’s hiring practices comply with federal civil rights law. The move is necessary given the nearly 40 years of illegal discrimination that has persisted under six New York City mayors.

. . .

It is well past time that New York City was forced to correct its failure. Mayor Michael Bloomberg, however, has vowed to appeal the decision. “The judge was not elected to run the city,” he said, “and you can rest assured that we’ll be in court for a long time.”

On the other hand, if I was standing in my own backyard and a man I knew to be a serious violent felon suddenly showed up in my backyard with a pistol in his hand and angrily charged up to within “close range” of me, and if I happened to also have a pistol in my hand because a few minutes earlier the serious violent felon’s son had been angrily waving his own pistol around and had tried to physically force his way into my garage to get at an associate of mine whom the serious violent felon and his son were looking for, and was still standing vigil outside my garage (wherein I had ensconced my young son to keep him safe from the chaos and threatened violence occurring in my backyard) when his father showed up, I think my “reflexes” would be quite different. I don’t think I’d have the same presence of mind I’d have if only faced with an angry but unarmed lady justice. I don’t think I’d have the “presence of mind” to just stand there and wait and see if I was going to be shot at point-blank range in the next split second.

Apparently, all of the Justices on the Indiana Supreme Court think they would. They apparently think they’d dial 911 during the 3 or so seconds it took the serious violent felon to march up to within point-blank range of them after first appearing in their backyard and tell the operator to send the police over right away because two armed and dangerous men are on their property. They apparently are not afraid in their judicial wisdom to declare that a person who reacted differently to that situation deserves to spend 45 years in prison.

Personally, I think they’d react more like Justice Prosser.

The facts in Brenda Moore v. State were not in dispute:

The defendant had consumed two tall cans of beer at her sister’s house on the evening of December 5, 2008. A friend of the defendant’s brother asked for a ride to visit a friend. The defendant explained to him that she could not drive because she had been drinking but that he could drive her car if he had a license. The brother’s friend then drove the defendant’s car with the defendant riding as a front seat passenger. When an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer pulled over the car because the license plate light was not working, the officer determined that the driver did not have a valid driver’s license and that the defendant could not operate the vehicle because she was intoxicated.

She was convicted of Public Intoxication, which is defined by Indiana statute as being “in a public place or a place of public resort in a state of intoxication caused by the person’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance.” From the Supreme Court’s opinion:

Established precedent has long recognized that a person in a vehicle stopped along a highway is in a public place for purposes of the public intoxication statute.

. . .

The defendant’s principal argument is that her conviction “violates the spirit of the public intoxication statute, and the policy behind its enactment” because she caused no harm or annoyance and “adhered to the popular public service motto ‘Don’t drink and drive.'” She favors a policy that would “encourage persons who find themselves intoxicated to ride in a vehicle to a private place without fear of being prosecuted for a crime.”

Whether conduct proscribed by a criminal law should be excused under certain circumstances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and statutory revision if appropriate. The judicial function is to apply the laws as enacted by the legislature. We decline the defendant’s request to reverse her conviction on public policy grounds.

(Citations omitted.)

But it was the court’s own “established precedent,” not the “laws as enacted by the legislature,” which supposedly “recognized” that a person inside a private vehicle is “in a public place.” And as the lone dissenter points out, other precedent and common sense supports a contrary conclusion. The majority offers no reason other than “because we said so” to justify its counter-intuitive insistence that a passenger inside of a closed private vehicle traveling along a highway is “in a public place” and should suffer criminal penalties merely because she’s intoxicated.

My prescription for what ails the Indiana Supreme Court and therefore the people of Indiana is a strong dose of Lysander Spooner:

Taking it for granted that it has now been shown that no rule of civil conduct, that is inconsistent with the natural rights of men, can be rightfully established by government, or consequently be made obligatory as law, either upon the people, or upon judicial tribunals ‑‑ let us now proceed to test the legality of slavery by those written constitutions of government, which judicial tribunals actually recognize as authoritative.

In making this examination, however, I shall not insist upon the principle of the preceding chapter, that there can be no law contrary to natural right; but shall admit, for the sake of the argument, that there may be such laws. I shall only claim that in the interpretation of all statutes and constitutions, the ordinary legal rules of interpretation be observed. The most important of these rules, and the one to which it will be necessary constantly to refer, is the one that all language must be construed “strictly” in favor of natural right.

What recently changed my mind about these cases is the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tyrus Coleman v. State (2011), and the utter failure of these cases to do Mr. Coleman (whom I represented at trial) any good. Now when I read Yeager the only significant thing about the case seems to me to be the fact that the defendant, Mr. Yeager, was an Enron executive.

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Mr. Coleman’s case came less than a week after that court rendered its infamous decision in Barnes, which purports to abrogate the right of the people to reasonably resist unlawful police entry into their homes. I lament the fact that Barnes has gotten all the attention and public vilification, while the court’s disposal of Coleman has gotten none, even though both cases equally exude the pernicious implication that only police officers are entitled to use force to defend themselves or others and that the only allowable recourse of a man facing armed and dangerous men who are in the act of invading his property is to call the police.

In the wake of the political fallout over Barnes the Indiana Attorney General has put on his white hat and joined the chorus condemning Barnes:

I support a rehearing of the case to allow for a more narrow ruling that would continue to recognize the individual right of reasonable resistance to unlawful entry. In our brief and argument to the Indiana Supreme Court last fall, my office did not advocate for the type of ruling the Court issued last week.

Here’s my response to that, borrowing from Eric Turkewitz: “Go shit in your white hat and pull it down over your ears.” Your office didn’t have to petition the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer after the Indiana Court of Appeals rendered its eminently reasonable decision that would have freed Tyrus Coleman — an innocent man — on the grounds of collateral estoppel, but it did.

And speaking of going above and beyond the call of duty, here are the principal considerations which normally govern the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant transfer:

(1)     Conflict in Court of Appeals’ Decisions. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals on the same important issue.

(2)    Conflict with Supreme Court Decision. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court on an important issue.

(3)    Conflict with Federal Appellate Decision. The Court of Appeals has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals.

(4)    Undecided Question of Law. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of law or a case of great public importance that has not been, but should be, decided by the Supreme Court.

(5)    Precedent in Need of Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals has correctly followed ruling precedent of the Supreme Court but such precedent is erroneous or in need of clarification or modification in some specific respect.

(6)    Significant Departure From Law or Practice. The Court of Appeals has so significantly departed from accepted law or practice or has sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or Administrative Agency as to warrant the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction.

You will search the Indiana Supreme Court’s published opinion in Coleman in vain for any new explication of the law of collateral estoppel, any explanation of how the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision had “departed from accepted law or practice” (let alone “significantly”), or any hint of the above-listed “considerations” which normally govern whether the Indiana Supreme Court grants transfer. Even though the first jury in Coleman’s case had acquitted him of murder and hung on the attempted murder charge (which in a just world and a just legal system would establish reasonable doubt as to Mr. Coleman’s guilt on both charges), and even though there was nothing contrary to established law in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the “Justices” on the Indiana Supreme Court chose to condemn Mr. Coleman to 45 years in prison for doing something that I believe with every fiber of my being was completely justified.

The defendant in error, to whom we will refer as defendant, was accused of the crime of murder in an information filed in the district court of Jefferson county. He entered a plea of not guilty and a jury was selected to try the case. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court, on motion of counsel for defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. It was the opinion of the trial court that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of any issue to the jury in that the sum total thereof established a clear case of justifiable homicide. The district attorney objected, and the case is here on writ of error requesting this court to render an opinion expressing its disapproval of the action of the trial court in directing the verdict of not guilty.

Eighteen witnesses testified during the trial; thirteen were called as witnesses for the prosecution and five for the defense, including the defendant himself. We have read the record and have found nothing therein which would warrant the submission of any issue to the jury for determination.

For purposes of focus and clarity we will summarize the pertinent facts leading up to the homicide. The defendant was employed as a pharmacist at the Kincaid Pharmacy, 7024 West Colfax Avenue, Lakewood, Colorado. His day’s work ended at about 12:30 A.M. After leaving his place of employment, he obtained something to eat at a nearby restaurant and started on his way home. He was driving east on West Colfax Avenue, toward the city of Denver, at about 1:30 A.M. An automobile approached his car from the rear. The driver of this auto made contact with the rear bumper of defendant’s car and thereupon forcibly, unlawfully, and deliberately accelerated his motor, precipitating the defendant forward for a substantial distance and through a red traffic light. There were four men in the automobile who were under the influence of intoxicating liquor in varying degrees. Prior to ramming the car of the defendant they had agreed to shove him along just for “kicks.” The defendant applied his brakes to the full; but the continuing force from behind precipitated him forward, causing all four wheels to leave a trail of skid marks. When defendant’s car ultimately came to a stop the auto containing the four men backed away a few feet. The defendant got out of his car and as he did so he placed a revolver beneath his belt. He had a permit to carry the gun. The four men got out of their auto and advanced toward the defendant threatening to “make you eat that damn gun,” to “mop up the street with you,” and also directed vile, profane and obscene language at him. The man who was in advance of his three companions kept moving toward defendant in a menacing manner. At this point the defendant shot him. As a result, he died at the scene of the affray.

In upholding the action of the trial court we think it sufficient to direct attention to the opinion of this court in People v. Urso, 129 Colo. 292, 269 P.2d 709, where we find, inter alia, the following pertinent language:

“* * * It is our opinion, and we so state, that if it is within the power of a trial court to set aside a verdict, not supported by competent legal evidence, then it is equally within the province and power of the court to prevent such a verdict ever coming into existence. In either position, before or after the verdict, the trial court is compelled to survey and analyze the evidence, and from the same evidence, his analysis would undoubtedly be the same before or after a verdict. If it is to the end that the evidence is insufficient or incompetent, and no part of it is convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, then he should be courageous enough to prevent a miscarriage of justice by a jury. * * *”

The law of justifiable homicide is well set forth by this court in the case of Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 107 P. 274:

“* * * When a person has reasonable grounds for believing, and does in fact actually believe, that danger of his being killed, or of receiving great bodily harm, is imminent, he may act on such appearances and defend himself, even to the extent of taking human life when necessary, although it may turn out that the appearances were false, or although he may have been mistaken as to the extent of the real or actual danger. * * *.”

The defendant was a stranger to all four occupants of the auto. He was peaceably on his way home from work, which terminated after midnight. Under the law and the circumstances disclosed by the record, defendant had the right to defend himself against the threatened assault of those whose lawlessness and utter disregard of his rights resulted in the justifiable killing of one of their number.

The judgment is affirmed.

But see Tyrus Coleman v. State of Indiana (2011). Mr. Coleman, you see, unlike Mr. La Voie, defended not only himself but his young son. Unlike Mr. La Voie he defended himself and his young son on his own property. Unlike Mr. La Voie he defended himself and his young son on his own property from two dangerous men armed with guns.

But, also unlike Mr. La Voie, Mr. Coleman lived in the wrong neighborhood. He had the wrong friends. He was the wrong color. He wasn’t a pharmacist. (Nor was he a cop.)

Ergo, Mr. Coleman, unlike Mr. La Voie, is “Guilty.”

First and foremost I know none of the individuals nor any of their family members involved in this. Having only followed coverage of this trial by this media. This is one of those traits of our court system that continues to perplex me. The Indiana Court of Appeals after careful consideration appeared to side with argument presented on behalf of Tyrus Coleman. The Indiana Supreme Court upon review of essentially the same evidence in turn rendered decision in total opposition to the lower court findings. Keep in mind, aside from the local trials these findings were not rendered by empaneled novice jurors. We as society are to then believe justice has truly been served in spite of the contradictions presented by our own court system.

“…Coleman had a criminal record and was on probation at the time, so, Rucker wrote, “We have not been persuaded that Coleman’s character or the nature of his offense requires a revision of Coleman’s sentence.”

Would it be unfair of me to mimic Justice Rucker’s apparent sense of logic as presented in the above quote and state that I have not found this session of the Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions logical when factored in with prior decision such as the ruling last week that one should not resist, but rather surrender self-protection and seek remedy later through the court if presented with illegal home invasion by authority; even if that authority is a K-9 officer gnawing on your flesh.

I borrow words that several years ago got an Indiana attorney suspended from the practice of law by the Indiana Supreme Court, and affirm that I am “left to wonder” by the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion whether the Indiana Supreme Court was determined to keep Tyrus Coleman in prison for the next few decades of his life — separated from the young son whose life along with his own he honorably and courageously defended on his own property on the tragic day in question — “and then said whatever was necessary to reach that conclusion (regardless of whether the facts or the law supported that conclusion).” I don’t express this opinion “with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Rather, I base this opinion on a careful comparison of the “intellectual integrity” of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that would have set Tyrus free with the intellectual integrity of the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion that condemns him to decades in prison, and on the observation that the Supreme Court’s opinion hardly addressed the argument that the Court of Appeals found convincing — if it can be said to have addressed it at all. I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and self-refuting assertion that “although Coleman had the opportunity to do so, he never used his cell phone to contact the police and inform them that two armed and dangerous men were on his property.” (Coleman had no opportunity to contact the police during the three or so seconds it took the second of these two armed and dangerous men, Anthony Dye, to march up to within “close range” of Coleman after first appearing in Coleman’s back yard.) I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and baseless assertion that Coleman and Dye were “friends.” I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s omission of the critical and undisputed fact that Coleman knew that Dye had previously served time in prison for shooting at a police officer. (Dye himself is currently serving a prison sentence for being a “serious violent felon” in possession of a handgun when he strode onto Coleman’s property.) I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s treating as an aggravator the fact that, when Coleman fired his weapon while standing directly in front of the only door to his garage, Coleman’s young son was inside that garage. I base this opinion, in part, on the Supreme Court’s factually inaccurate and misleading assertion that “After Dye was immobilized and fell to the ground, Coleman fired again striking Dye in the chest.” This clearly implies, falsely, that Coleman shot Dye after he was already on the ground and no longer a threat. (Earlier in the opinion, the court asserts: “As Dye stepped in front of Coleman, Coleman raised his gun and fired at Dye, who immediately fell to the ground. Coleman then shot Dye a second time.”) In fact, the evidence at trial and in the record clearly demonstrated the falsity of this implication. Dye “fell” forward to the ground and landed on his stomach. The round that struck him in the chest clearly was fired before Dye fell to the ground. Furthermore, the surveillance video which captured the entire incident clearly showed that, at the time this second shot must have been fired, Dye, as he was “falling” forward towards the ground, was not “immobilized” but was raising his gun and pointing it at Coleman.

I borrow the words of another man who was falsely and unjustly condemned by men less honorable than he:

Do not judge or go to law, do not punish, and you yourself will not be judged or punished. Forgive everyone and you will be forgiven; but if you judge others they will judge you also.

You cannot judge, for men are all blind and do not see the truth. How can you see a speck in your brother’s eye when there is dust in your own? You must first get your own eye clear-but whose eyes are perfectly clear? Can a blind man lead the blind? They will both fall into the pit.

And those who judge and punish are like blind men leading the blind.

Those who judge, and condemn others to violent treatment, wounds, mutilation, or death, wish to correct them, but what can come of their teaching except that the pupils will learn to become just like their teacher? What then will they do when they have learnt the lesson? Only what their teacher does: violence and murder.

And do not expect to find justice in the courts. To entrust one’s love of justice to men’s courts is like throwing precious pearls to swine: they will trample on them and will tear you to pieces.

There’s not much I can say. Words, including the words of which the law is made, are worthless. I represented that innocent man at trial.

[T]here is a rule older and superior to that of the Constitution.  Many Americans do not believe that to be the case.  There is a philosophical divide in America, with the Justices of the Indiana court, and their Constitution, on one side, and a different law on the other.

One American called it “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God”.

One Englishman called it “the Law of the Jungle”. [Link added.]

In the recently published decision that Patrick is referring to, Barnes v. State, a majority of the Indiana Supreme Court holds that “the right to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law.”

The dissenters describe the majority as having “abrogated” this right. But rights can’t be “abrogated.” They can only be ignored and violated.

There is no right more fundamental than the right to defend one’s self, family, and home. Verily, from this right derives whatever justification, if any, “the law” itself might have. Yet the Indiana Supreme Court in Barnes cites with apparent approval “legal scholarship” which “[i]n the 1920s . . . began criticizing” the right to resist unlawful police action “as valuing individual liberty over physical security of the officers.” But as a commenter at the Volokh Conspiracy trenchantly observes: “There is a reason why officer safety is not included in the Bill of Rights, and that is because they are part of the danger being protected against.”

In actuality, though, “the law” and the State derived from the Constitution doesn’t exist “to protect and serve.” Rather, it exists to extort and exploit, and whatever protecting it might do is secondary and incidental to that overarching purpose. To see that this is so, compare what the State has done to this man who honorably and courageously defended himself and his son and friends from two armed and dangerous men on his own property, with what the State didn’t do to this cowardly police officer who gunned down a man on a city street without justification.

If “the law” fails to recognize the right of a man to defend himself and his family and friends on his own property, then it is good for nothing except to be thrown out and trampled underfoot.

Or maybe it’s really not Morlock’s fault. Maybe war just does that to people. In which case we should never, ever, go to war, unless it’s actually to defend ourselves. We should bring all of “our” troops home this very minute.

Morlock was sentenced yesterday to a mere 24 years in prison for willful and gratuitous and inexcusable murder. A former client of mine was convicted by a jury and sentenced by a judge to 45 years in prison for justifiably defending himself and his son and friends on his own property from two angry men brandishing guns. I blame myself — but not only myself — for his conviction, and I swear to God if it could free him I’d turn my bar card in to the supreme court in less than a second. Every day I await and look for the decision of five fallible men in Indianapolis, who hold his fate in their hands. Our justice system deserves no respect. Neither does our military. As someone who enlisted at the age of 17 and “served” until the age of 23, I generally feel sorry for those who’ve made the same supreme mistake I did, whose parents didn’t have enough wisdom to impress upon their children that working at Burger King would be infinitely more honorable. But I don’t feel sorry for Morlock. He’d be better off dead. It would be even better if he’d never been born.

And still . . . let me offer an argument for the existence of God, and a sign that a deep and abiding and holy decency remains buried deep within the American spirit, a decency that on occasion even the State is forced to recognize. Let me hold up the example of Hugh Thompson, as described in the words of the citation accompanying the Soldier’s Medal, which he was finally awarded almost 30 years after his heroic actions during the My Lai massacre in Vietnam:

For heroism above and beyond the call of duty on
16 March 1968, while saving the lives of at least 10
Vietnamese civilians during the unlawful massacre of
noncombatants by American forces at My Lai, Quang
Ngai Province, South Vietnam. Warrant Officer
Thompson landed his helicopter in the line of fire between
fleeing Vietnamese civilians and pursuing American
ground troops to prevent their murder. He then
personally confronted the leader of the American ground
troops and was prepared to open fire on those American
troops should they fire upon the civilians. Warrant Officer
Thompson, at the risk of his own personal safety, went
forward of the American lines and coaxed the Vietnamese
civilians out of the bunker to enable their evacuation.
Leaving the area after requesting and overseeing the
civilians’ air evacuation, his crew spotted movement in a
ditch filled with bodies south of My Lai Four. Warrant
Officer Thompson again landed his helicopter and covered
his crew as they retrieved a wounded child from the pile of
bodies. He then flew the child to the safety of a hospital at
Quang Ngai. Warrant Officer Thompson’s relayed radio
reports of the massacre and subsequent report to his
section leader and commander resulted in an order for the
cease fire at My Lai and an end to the killing of innocent
civilians. Warrant Officer Thompson’s Heroism
exemplifies the highest standards of personal courage and
ethical conduct, reflecting distinct credit on him, and the
United States Army.