What recently changed my mind about these cases is the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tyrus Coleman v. State (2011), and the utter failure of these cases to do Mr. Coleman (whom I represented at trial) any good. Now when I read Yeager the only significant thing about the case seems to me to be the fact that the defendant, Mr. Yeager, was an Enron executive.

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Mr. Coleman’s case came less than a week after that court rendered its infamous decision in Barnes, which purports to abrogate the right of the people to reasonably resist unlawful police entry into their homes. I lament the fact that Barnes has gotten all the attention and public vilification, while the court’s disposal of Coleman has gotten none, even though both cases equally exude the pernicious implication that only police officers are entitled to use force to defend themselves or others and that the only allowable recourse of a man facing armed and dangerous men who are in the act of invading his property is to call the police.

In the wake of the political fallout over Barnes the Indiana Attorney General has put on his white hat and joined the chorus condemning Barnes:

I support a rehearing of the case to allow for a more narrow ruling that would continue to recognize the individual right of reasonable resistance to unlawful entry. In our brief and argument to the Indiana Supreme Court last fall, my office did not advocate for the type of ruling the Court issued last week.

Here’s my response to that, borrowing from Eric Turkewitz: “Go shit in your white hat and pull it down over your ears.” Your office didn’t have to petition the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer after the Indiana Court of Appeals rendered its eminently reasonable decision that would have freed Tyrus Coleman — an innocent man — on the grounds of collateral estoppel, but it did.

And speaking of going above and beyond the call of duty, here are the principal considerations which normally govern the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant transfer:

(1)     Conflict in Court of Appeals’ Decisions. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals on the same important issue.

(2)    Conflict with Supreme Court Decision. The Court of Appeals has entered a decision in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court on an important issue.

(3)    Conflict with Federal Appellate Decision. The Court of Appeals has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals.

(4)    Undecided Question of Law. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of law or a case of great public importance that has not been, but should be, decided by the Supreme Court.

(5)    Precedent in Need of Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals has correctly followed ruling precedent of the Supreme Court but such precedent is erroneous or in need of clarification or modification in some specific respect.

(6)    Significant Departure From Law or Practice. The Court of Appeals has so significantly departed from accepted law or practice or has sanctioned such a departure by a trial court or Administrative Agency as to warrant the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction.

You will search the Indiana Supreme Court’s published opinion in Coleman in vain for any new explication of the law of collateral estoppel, any explanation of how the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision had “departed from accepted law or practice” (let alone “significantly”), or any hint of the above-listed “considerations” which normally govern whether the Indiana Supreme Court grants transfer. Even though the first jury in Coleman’s case had acquitted him of murder and hung on the attempted murder charge (which in a just world and a just legal system would establish reasonable doubt as to Mr. Coleman’s guilt on both charges), and even though there was nothing contrary to established law in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the “Justices” on the Indiana Supreme Court chose to condemn Mr. Coleman to 45 years in prison for doing something that I believe with every fiber of my being was completely justified.

So says Steve Nolt, professor of Mennonite history at Goshen College, as quoted in an Elkhart Truth article about the college’s reversal last week of its decision last March to begin playing an instrumental version of the Star Spangled Banner before sporting events. Before that, the college didn’t play the national anthem at all, and it’s now resuming that policy. (However, although the college has now stopped playing the “Star Spangled Banner,” it apparently still flies the Star Spangled Banner.)

The Mennonites, along with the Church of the Brethren and the Quakers, are one of the three historic “peace churches”:

The peace churches agree that Jesus advocated nonviolence. Whether physical force can ever be justified, either in defending oneself or others, remains controversial. Many believers adhere strictly to a moral attitude of nonresistance in the face of violence. But these churches generally do concur that violence on behalf of nations and their governments is contrary to Christian morality.

I note that according to the Gospels Jesus chased the money-changers from the temple with a whip. I’m convinced that the use of physical force against another human being is subhuman, but that the use of such force is obviously sometimes necessary and justified. Physical force (which includes, obviously, imprisonment) should only be used as a last resort. There should be a very strong presumption against its use, whether by individuals or by groups of individuals or by self-styled “governments.” (A father whose daughter has been raped probably shouldn’t shoot and kill the rapist, but if he does, we probably shouldn’t put him in prison for doing so.)

But the peculiar historic “pacifism” of the Quakers, for example, which forbade Quakers to take up “carnal weapons” themselves but approved of the “magistrate” doing so, is hopelessly lacking in integrity, as illustrated by this anecdote from Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography:

Mr. Logan . . . told me the following anecdote of his old master, William Penn, respecting defense. He came over from England, when a young man, with that proprietary, and as his secretary. It was war-time, and their ship was chas’d by an armed vessel, suppos’ed to be an enemy. Their captain prepar’d for defense; but told William Penn, and his company of Quakers, that he did not expect their assistance, and they might retire into the cabin, which they did, except James Logan, who chose to stay upon deck, and was quarter’d to a gun. The suppos’d enemy prov’d a friend, so there was no fighting; but when the secretary went down to communicate the intelligence, William Penn rebuk’d him severely for staying upon deck, and undertaking to assist in defending the vessel, contrary to the principles of Friends, especially as it had not been required by the captain. This reproof, being before all the company, piqu’d the secretary, who anser’d, “I being thy servant, why did thee not order me to come down? But thee was willing enough that I should stay and help to fight the ship when thee thought there was danger.”

David Gross, a tax resister, highlights another related incoherence to which Quakers and other religious “pacifists” are sadly prone:

It still perplexes me when I talk to people from the substantial pacifist contingent in the war tax resistance movement and find that for many of them, while they’re not convinced violence or the threat of violence would be an appropriate response to the aggression of, say, a Nazi Germany, or even to an armed intruder trying to break into your home — the government using violence to force people to contribute to education, the arts, scientific research, and other such nice things is peachy keen.  Would they go door-to-door taking donations for the National Endowment for the Arts at gunpoint, I wonder?

Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court, of all people, has grasped a necessary distinction that eludes many pacifists:

Willingness to use force in self-defense, in defense of home and family, or in defense against immediate acts of aggressive violence toward other persons in the community, has not been regarded as inconsistent with a claim of conscientious objection to war as such.

That is, it’s not violence per se which is everywhere and always intrinsically evil. It’s the State.

The defendant in error, to whom we will refer as defendant, was accused of the crime of murder in an information filed in the district court of Jefferson county. He entered a plea of not guilty and a jury was selected to try the case. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court, on motion of counsel for defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. It was the opinion of the trial court that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of any issue to the jury in that the sum total thereof established a clear case of justifiable homicide. The district attorney objected, and the case is here on writ of error requesting this court to render an opinion expressing its disapproval of the action of the trial court in directing the verdict of not guilty.

Eighteen witnesses testified during the trial; thirteen were called as witnesses for the prosecution and five for the defense, including the defendant himself. We have read the record and have found nothing therein which would warrant the submission of any issue to the jury for determination.

For purposes of focus and clarity we will summarize the pertinent facts leading up to the homicide. The defendant was employed as a pharmacist at the Kincaid Pharmacy, 7024 West Colfax Avenue, Lakewood, Colorado. His day’s work ended at about 12:30 A.M. After leaving his place of employment, he obtained something to eat at a nearby restaurant and started on his way home. He was driving east on West Colfax Avenue, toward the city of Denver, at about 1:30 A.M. An automobile approached his car from the rear. The driver of this auto made contact with the rear bumper of defendant’s car and thereupon forcibly, unlawfully, and deliberately accelerated his motor, precipitating the defendant forward for a substantial distance and through a red traffic light. There were four men in the automobile who were under the influence of intoxicating liquor in varying degrees. Prior to ramming the car of the defendant they had agreed to shove him along just for “kicks.” The defendant applied his brakes to the full; but the continuing force from behind precipitated him forward, causing all four wheels to leave a trail of skid marks. When defendant’s car ultimately came to a stop the auto containing the four men backed away a few feet. The defendant got out of his car and as he did so he placed a revolver beneath his belt. He had a permit to carry the gun. The four men got out of their auto and advanced toward the defendant threatening to “make you eat that damn gun,” to “mop up the street with you,” and also directed vile, profane and obscene language at him. The man who was in advance of his three companions kept moving toward defendant in a menacing manner. At this point the defendant shot him. As a result, he died at the scene of the affray.

In upholding the action of the trial court we think it sufficient to direct attention to the opinion of this court in People v. Urso, 129 Colo. 292, 269 P.2d 709, where we find, inter alia, the following pertinent language:

“* * * It is our opinion, and we so state, that if it is within the power of a trial court to set aside a verdict, not supported by competent legal evidence, then it is equally within the province and power of the court to prevent such a verdict ever coming into existence. In either position, before or after the verdict, the trial court is compelled to survey and analyze the evidence, and from the same evidence, his analysis would undoubtedly be the same before or after a verdict. If it is to the end that the evidence is insufficient or incompetent, and no part of it is convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, then he should be courageous enough to prevent a miscarriage of justice by a jury. * * *”

The law of justifiable homicide is well set forth by this court in the case of Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 107 P. 274:

“* * * When a person has reasonable grounds for believing, and does in fact actually believe, that danger of his being killed, or of receiving great bodily harm, is imminent, he may act on such appearances and defend himself, even to the extent of taking human life when necessary, although it may turn out that the appearances were false, or although he may have been mistaken as to the extent of the real or actual danger. * * *.”

The defendant was a stranger to all four occupants of the auto. He was peaceably on his way home from work, which terminated after midnight. Under the law and the circumstances disclosed by the record, defendant had the right to defend himself against the threatened assault of those whose lawlessness and utter disregard of his rights resulted in the justifiable killing of one of their number.

The judgment is affirmed.

But see Tyrus Coleman v. State of Indiana (2011). Mr. Coleman, you see, unlike Mr. La Voie, defended not only himself but his young son. Unlike Mr. La Voie he defended himself and his young son on his own property. Unlike Mr. La Voie he defended himself and his young son on his own property from two dangerous men armed with guns.

But, also unlike Mr. La Voie, Mr. Coleman lived in the wrong neighborhood. He had the wrong friends. He was the wrong color. He wasn’t a pharmacist. (Nor was he a cop.)

Ergo, Mr. Coleman, unlike Mr. La Voie, is “Guilty.”