{"id":1235,"date":"2011-08-27T16:01:09","date_gmt":"2011-08-27T20:01:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=1235"},"modified":"2011-11-13T15:49:21","modified_gmt":"2011-11-13T19:49:21","slug":"the-philosophy-and-practice-of-law-and-liberty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=1235","title":{"rendered":"The Philosophy and Practice of Law and Liberty"},"content":{"rendered":"
The above was the original subtitle of this blog, before I changed it<\/a> sometime back to “Fairly Undermining Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice.”<\/p>\n But you know who really excels at illuminating the philosophy and practice of law and liberty? Matt Brown, relative to whom I’m a piker. I want to highlight here a couple paragraphs from his latest post<\/a>.<\/p>\n First:<\/p>\n When you judge evidence as it\u2019s presented, you\u2019re seeing things through a filter. You\u2019re relying on your preexisting opinions, and those are often opinions the judge and jurors do not share. You can\u2019t read minds, so the best way to convince your audience is to build your position from nothing. When every person experiences the birth and growth of the point you\u2019re trying to make, that\u2019s when you have your best chance of getting them to agree. Inserting your judgments only dilutes your effectiveness.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This struck me as in line with my citation<\/a> of Vincent Bugliosi’s account of his successful defense of a murder defendant in And the Sea Will Tell<\/em> in countering what I perceived as Mark Bennett’s unfair assessment of John Regan’s assertion that the only reliable<\/em> way to win for a criminal defendant is to have evidence devastating to the prosecution’s case and to downplay its significance until closing argument. (I acknowledge, however, that it’s not entirely clear what John Regan meant, as I later noted in a comment on his blog<\/a>.)<\/p>\n Second:<\/p>\n In the moment, what you notice may be better than what you were seeking. Even if it isn\u2019t, at least you noticed it. You certainly aren\u2019t missing anything. Your perspective is likely closer to that of the people you\u2019re trying to convince, and your presentation isn\u2019t going to come off sounding like biased ramblings from a nut job. When judgment is necessary, like when you hear something objectionable, you\u2019ll be quicker to realize it and voice your position. There\u2019s no drawback.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Having been recently called<\/a> a “nut job” myself, this paragraph in Matt’s post also made my ears perk up. Take, for example, my recent strongly-stated counter-intuitive affirmation<\/a> that “Prosecutors should never lose,” because they have no business prosecuting anything other than “slam-dunk” cases (since the requirement of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” requires nothing less), and every loss is an indictment of either their judgment or their competence. I stand by the proposition that “Prosecutors should almost never lose.” After all, Spence and Bugliosi managed that feat in their respective prosecutorial careers, and if not every prosecutor can be a Spence or a Bugliosi, they can at least be expected to win at least, say, 90% of their trials. If they’re not, and assuming they’re competent, they’re probably convicting a lot of innocent defendants in the trials that they do win.<\/p>\n On the other hand, another former prosecutor whose judgment I respect, Ken at Popehat, has suggested<\/a> that the standard I’ve proposed is probably “unworkable.” Imagine a hypothetical murder case in which the evidence demonstrates a 95% likelihood that the accused is guilty. But damn — that leaves a 5% chance that the accused is innocent, and faces life in prison for something he didn’t do. Furthermore, sending the accused, a possibly innocent man, to prison for the rest of his life isn’t going to bring the murder victim back. Nevertheless, it’s probably too much to expect the prosecutor, faced with the victim’s family, to dismiss the case against the accused based on a 5% likelihood that he is innocent. And pity the poor jury. This is a case that indeed could go either way.<\/p>\n This not-so-hypothetical scenario highlights a fundamental problem with the extant criminal justice system: the jury is expected to evaluate whether the 5% likelihood that the defendant is innocent amounts to “reasonable” doubt as to his guilt, all the while being kept in ignorance of and having no say in the consequences for the defendant if it determines that the 5% likelihood that the defendant is innocent doesn’t amount to “reasonable” doubt. Would it be “reasonable” for a person to take a bet in which he has a 95% chance of winning $100 and a 5% chance of losing $500? Yes. Would it be “reasonable” for a person to take a bet in which he has a 95% chance of winning $100 and a 5% chance of losing $5,000? No. The reasonableness of the bet depends entirely on the consequences of “losing,” or being wrong.<\/p>\n In a just criminal justice system the jury would be empowered to limit the consequences of its own possible error, and thereby to ensure, or create, at least by its own lights, the “reasonableness” of its own verdict in light of whatever residual doubt it might have as to the defendant’s “guilt.” In the above hypothetical, for example, where the jury is only 95% confident that the defendant is guilty of murder, it might impose a 10 year sentence (presumably determined by the maximum number of years the jurors were able unanimously to agree upon). Such a decision might have little to do with “punishing” the defendant, who after all could be innocent (although it’s likely that the decision would have been influenced by regard for the feelings of the victim’s family), and more to do with public safety, which is arguably the primary purpose<\/a> of the criminal justice system. In a just criminal justice system this empowerment of the jury would extend beyond correcting for any residual doubt as to whether the defendant in fact committed the crime with which he’s charged to also correcting for any residual doubt as to the defendant’s culpability and future dangerousness to society, independently of whether he in fact committed the crime charged.<\/p>\n The State, of course, is the principal impediment to the evolution of a just criminal justice “system.” As Darian Worden writes today<\/a> at the Center for a Stateless Society, in a post titled “Justice Without the State”:<\/p>\n