{"id":2349,"date":"2013-12-12T16:09:45","date_gmt":"2013-12-12T20:09:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=2349"},"modified":"2013-12-13T11:47:59","modified_gmt":"2013-12-13T15:47:59","slug":"in-defense-of-tyranny","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=2349","title":{"rendered":"In Defense of Tyranny"},"content":{"rendered":"
It seems to me that probably my favorite novel of all time, Eumeswil<\/em>, by Ernst Juenger, is half Utopia<\/em> and half The Prince<\/em>. The narrator, who calls himself an anarch rather than an anarchist, tends the night bar in the castle of Eumeswil’s ruler, the Condor. During his interview for this job, under the influence of a truth drug administered by the interviewers, he had identified the Condor as a “tyrant.” This apparently raised no alarms, as he was hired nonetheless.<\/p>\n An Amazon reviewer of Eumeswil<\/em> calls the novel “a glimpse as to how intellect can convince itself to serve power.” (Many apparently cannot forgive Juenger for serving in the German Army during WWII in occupied Paris instead of martyring himself.) But the Condor is no Hitler. Indeed, he comes across in the novel as quite honorable and just. What then made him, correctly speaking, a “tyrant”? Only this: He came to power by overthrowing the previously reigning “tribunes,” and therefore his rule lacked so-called “legitimacy.” That is, he had no Authority, no Divine Right, to rule.<\/p>\n But is this in itself so bad? To the contrary, the Condor’s admission of the narrator into his inner circle, despite (or perhaps even because of) the latter’s honesty, is an indication that the Condor’s rule is free of the pretense that defines the State.<\/p>\n As I indicated in a recent post, I’ve revised my previous opinion that “ruling” defines the State. Frankly, this definition of the State was largely a product of my attachment to a standard definition of Anarchy as “rulerlessness” and my corresponding attraction to the basic idea in John Hasnas’ article The Depoliticization of Law<\/a>,\u00a0<\/em>that law can be the product of human action without being the product of human design. While this idea might be optimal, it’s not essential. Justice is what is essential, and the sole determinant of legitimacy. (What is Justice? In my humble opinion, nothing more and nothing less than the Presumption of Innocence, but that’s the subject of another post.) A code apparatus, or even the decree of a “tyrant,” can be just, and can certainly be more just than the decrees of a so-called “democracy.”<\/p>\n