{"id":2445,"date":"2016-01-05T18:35:50","date_gmt":"2016-01-05T22:35:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=2445"},"modified":"2016-01-05T18:40:07","modified_gmt":"2016-01-05T22:40:07","slug":"the-indiana-court-of-appeals-says-i-am-a-recognized-scholar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.peoplevstate.com\/?p=2445","title":{"rendered":"The Indiana Court of Appeals says I am a “recognized scholar.”"},"content":{"rendered":"
So did the post-conviction court<\/a>. But recognized as a scholar by whom? The Court of Appeals and the post-conviction court were presumably referring to this Comment I wrote for the Wisconsin Law Review when I was a law student way back in 1998, which the State brought up at the post-conviction hearing: John Kindley, The Fit Between the Elements for an Informed Consent Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with Increased Breast Cancer Risk<\/em>, 1998 WLR 1595<\/a>. But the Indiana Court of Appeals, in its opinion calling me a “recognized scholar,” didn’t actually cite this piece of scholarship. Nor did the Eighth Circuit in its recent “embarrassing”<\/a> abortion decision, which instead merely cited<\/a> the declaration, submitted by the State of North Dakota, of a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist licensed in North Dakota, who “explained some studies support a connection between abortion and breast cancer.” Nor did the North Dakota Supreme Court in disposing, back in 2003<\/a>, of a false advertising suit I brought against the very same abortion clinic that brought suit as the plaintiff in the Eighth Circuit case. Nor did the courts in California in disposing, in 2003-2004<\/a>, of a similar false advertising case brought there.<\/p>\n In fact, the last time I was “recognized” as a “scholar” was by then-Congressman Dave Weldon, M.D., back on August 24, 1999<\/a> — more than 15 years ago.<\/p>\n The Indiana Court of Appeals (and the post-conviction court) also think that I am “well read.” Let me share an excellent piece of legal scholarship I did happen to read not too long ago, that I think concerns and should interest them very much: The Origins of “Reasonable Doubt”<\/em> (2005), by Yale law prof James Q. Whitman<\/a>. Its thesis is close to something Gerry Spence wrote in one of his books, also published in 2005, which he framed as an argument to a hypothetical jury:<\/p>\n The protection of reasonable doubt is not just a protection for Jimmy. It protects each of you. You are men and women with good souls and clear consciences. But what if you were pressured by the prosecution’s arguments to convict Jimmy, and when you got home you began to worry about what you had done, lying awake at night concerned about your decision, your worry that you may have convicted an innocent man?<\/p>\n The rule of reasonable doubt is to protect you. You have a right not to be concerned about your decision. It must be clear to you so that all worry about whether you were right has been removed by the evidence. That is why we have reasonable doubt — not only to protect the accused, but to protect you as well.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n